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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
Henry Jeffry Suarez 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 980268-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SINCE THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IS UNDISPUTED IN 
THIS CASE, THE ONLY QUESTION ON APPEAL IS WHETHER THE RECORD 
SUPPORTS BAD FAITH AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
Defendant/Appellant Henry Jeffry Suarez ("Suarez") has 
appealed to this Court to reverse his convictions for rape of a 
child and sodomy on a child on the grounds that the state was 
barred under the double jeopardy provisions of the state and 
federal constitutions from prosecuting the matter. (Opening 
Brief, dated December 7, 1998.) In its brief, the state has re-
cognized that in a case where a criminal defendant has requested 
a mistrial, as in Suarez's case, and the request is granted, 
double jeopardy will bar retrial of the matter if the judge or 
the prosecutor provoked the mistrial in bad faith. (State's Brief 
at 9-11.) Suarez has raised the issue of bad faith on appeal. 
(Opening Brief at 7-15.) 
As stated in the Opening Brief, the transcript of the second 
trial reflects that during opening statements,1 counsel for the 
1 The first trial ended in a mistrial during jury voir dire. That 
proceeding is not relevant to this appeal. 
defense asserted that the state failed to conduct an adequate 
investigation into the rape and sodomy charges. (R. 464:29.) 
Thereafter, during its case-in-chief, the state called Detective 
James Chandler to testify. (R. 464:143.) 
During the state's direct examination, Chandler described 
his investigative efforts, including the fact that he interviewed 
the victim and Suarez's wife. (R. 464:144-149.) The prosecutor 
asked questions concerning Suarez's wife, and the defense 
objected during a side-bar conference that such testimony 
violated Suarez's constitutional right not to have his spouse 
testify against him. (See R. 464:164-66.) After the side-bar 
conference, the prosecutor asked additional questions concerning 
Chandler's investigative efforts. Chandler testified that he was 
unable to obtain information regarding the matter from Suarez 
because he refused to talk to Chandler. (R. 464:148-49.) The 
defense objected to the testimony on the basis that it violated 
Suarez's due process rights under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 
(1976), and the trial court granted a mistrial. (R. 464:175.) 
Thereafter, the defense requested a dismissal of the charges 
on the grounds that double jeopardy barred the state from pro-
ceeding with another trial in the matter since the prosecutor 
provoked the mistrial in bad faith. (R. 160-80.) The trial 
judge stated that the prosecutor "didn't elicit the statement in 
this case, so I don't find that it's prosecution error." (R. 
464:173-74.) In a hearing on the matter, the judge considered the 
pleadings and transcript of the proceedings and found that the 
2 
witness made an error in judgment when he testified in violation 
of Doyle. (R. 465:4.) The court concluded there was no bad faith. 
On appeal, the state claims Suarez has failed to challenge 
the trial court's findings in this matter. (State's Brief at 12, 
14.) Yet, Suarez does not contest the content of the trial 
transcript. Rather, Suarez has challenged the ruling as incorrect 
as a matter of law. (See Opening Brief at 6-15.) That is, where 
the issue of bad faith normally "is a mixed question of law and 
fact," see Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315-16 (Utah 
1998) (citing Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah 
App. 1989)); State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324 (Utah App. 1998); 
(Opening Brief at 1), since the issue in the case is based on an 
undisputed transcript, the standard of review should be the 
correction-of-error standard for questions of law, where this 
Court will give no deference to the trial court's ruling.2 
This Court has recognized application of the correction-of-
error standard in numerous contexts where the issue is based on 
an undisputed transcript. In that context, this Court will treat 
the issue on appeal as a conclusion that presents a "question[] 
of law which we review under a correction of error standard." 
2 As a point of clarification, the standard of review identified 
in Suarez's Opening Brief is incomplete since it recognizes only 
that the issue of bad faith is a mixed question of law and fact. 
(Opening Brief at 1.) However, as reflected in the Opening 
Brief, Suarez is not contesting the content of the transcript and 
has raised the issue of bad faith as a matter of law. (Opening 
Brief at 7-15.) The standard of review in the Opening Brief 
should be amended to reflect that where the issue on appeal is 
based on an undisputed transcript, this Court will review the 
matter under a correction-of-error standard. 
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State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah App. 1997) (citing 
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993)); State v. 
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993) (observing appellate 
courts review conclusions of law under non-deferential correction 
of error standard when facts are undisputed); Vali Convalescent 
and Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care Financing, 797 
P.2d 438, 450 (Utah App. 1990) (where conclusions are based on 
undisputed facts, this Court reviews the matter under the 
correction-of-error standard); see also Transamerica Cash 
Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 
1990) (same standard for review of summary judgment, which 
necessarily involves undisputed facts); Trulis v. Barton, 107 
F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that uncontroverted 
facts may demonstrate "bad faith as a matter of law"). 
Accordingly, the question in this case is whether the transcript 
supports that as a matter of law the prosecutor acted in bad 
faith.3 
Specifically, a prosecutor is charged with knowing the 
investigator's case. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 n.5 
(Utah 1987). In this case, the prosecutor would have known that 
questions concerning witness cooperation during the investigation 
would eventually lead to a Doyle violation, since the prosecutor 
3 If the prosecutor had asked the following question of 
Chandler, her motive in provoking a mistrial would have been 
clearer: "Officer, were you hoping to talk to the defendant but 
he refused to talk to you because he invoked his Miranda rights?" 
Because the prosecutor's question was not that direct, the 
analysis is more complex, as set forth in the Opening Brief. 
(Opening Brief, at 7-15.) 
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would have known that Suarez did not cooperate with the officer 
because he had exercised his right to remain silent. (Opening 
Brief at 11-13.) Notwithstanding her knowledge of the situation, 
the prosecutor continued examining Chandler about the matter 
without admonishing him not to discuss Suarez's involvement in 
the investigation. See State v. Jones, 645 P.2d 656, 656-57 (Utah 
1982) (where the judge and prosecutor admonished officer not to 
discuss certain matters, his testimony in violation of the 
admonitions was a complete surprise). 
In addition, in the Opening Brief, Suarez pointed out that 
as the prosecutor continued questioning the officer about his 
investigation, she drew objections for other constitutional 
violations. The prosecutor was on notice that her examination 
was leading the officer into areas that constitutionally were 
impermissible. (Opening Brief at 13.) Also, the prosecutor was 
pursuing an inappropriate line of questioning in that she had 
diverted from establishing a prima facie case to rebutting 
unproven facts. See Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Utah 
App. 1998) ("Rebuttal evidence should be limited to evidence made 
necessary by the opponent's case-in-reply ... and evidence 
required to counter new facts presented in the defendant's case-
in-chief")/ (R. 464:153). 
The trial court recognized that by pursuing the line of 
questioning, the prosecutor ran the risk of a mistrial. 
[T]he whole line of questioning [by the state] on [the 
officer's] investigation - Mr. Yengich has said in opening 
statement, which is not evidence, that your investigator's 
were not thorough. You don't have to rebut that. I don't 
5 
understand why you are rebutting that. 
Present your case, and then if it turns out they are 
not thorough, then bring it back on rebuttal after he's 
presented his case. But to prove, as a matter of your case 
in chief, to rebut something that's said in opening 
statement doesn't seem to me to give me any help and the 
jury any help, and only runs the risk of this kind of motion 
[for a mistrial] being raised. 
(R. 464:153.) The state does not dispute the circumstances set 
forth above giving rise to the mistrial. They support bad faith. 
See In re Keeaan Management Co., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(pursuit of improper argument constituted bad faith). 
Also, the state claims this Court's ruling in State v. 
Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993), is not controlling here. 
(See State's Brief at 16.) That is incorrect. In Nilson, this 
Court was required to consider undisputed facts to resolve issues 
concerning application of the double jeopardy provision. In 
doing so, this Court recognized that factual matters presenting a 
"close call" must be resolved in defendant's favor. 
Specifically, in Nilson, the victim testified that the 
offense occurred on a date other than that which was charged in 
the Information. As a result of the testimony, the state moved 
to dismiss the case. The defense did not object to the 
dismissal. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029. This Court was required to 
determine whether a "lack of objection" constituted consent, 
which would prevent double jeopardy from attaching. In refusing 
to find consent, this Court specified that any doubts or close 
calls with respect to the matter would be resolved "in a 
defendant's favor." Nilson, 854 P.2d at 1032. 
In Suarez's case, the matter concerns the prosecutor's 
6 
motives and intentions in pursuing an improper line of 
questioning. The doubts and close calls surrounding that issue 
should be resolved in Suarez's favor, specifically since the 
prosecutor was in a unique position in that she shared in the 
officer's knowledge about the investigation, he was her witness, 
and he was a member of the prosecution team. Knight, 734 P.2d at 
918 n.5. In addition, the prosecutor was undeterred in her 
determination to continue an improper line of questioning even 
after a bench conference concerning the constitutional validity 
of questions about the officer's investigation of the matter. To 
the extent the undisputed transcript in this matter raises doubts 
or close calls with respect to the matter, they should be 
resolved in Suarez's favor pursuant to Nilson. 
Finally, the state asserts that even if the prosecutor 
intended that her line of questioning would lead the officer to 
providing testimony in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 
(1976), the questions were justified "by the fact that defense 
counsel 'opened the door' to this line of questioning by putting 
at issue the State's investigative effort." (State's Brief at 
14-15.) The state's argument on this point is not supported by 
the record or Utah law. 
Indeed, the state's open-door argument was specifically 
rejected by the trial judge. He criticized the prosecutor for 
pursuing the improper line of questioning since the door had not 
been opened with evidence of the matter. (R. 464:153.) 
Further, the state relies on State v. Rudolph, 349 Utah Adv. 
7 
Rep. 11, 17 (Utah 1998), in making its open-door argument. That 
case is distinguishable. In Rudolph, the defendant elicited 
testimony from a state witness, and the state followed-up on 
redirect with additional questions concerning the matter. Id. 
Defendant claimed the state's follow-up questions were inap-
propriate. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the defendant 
opened the door to the line of questioning when he elicited 
testimony from the witness. Id. at 17. Rudolph supports the 
determination that the open-door doctrine does not apply here, 
since, as the trial court in Suarez's case found, no evidence had 
been presented that would have allowed the state to pursue the 
line of questioning in this case that resulted in the Doyle 
violation. (See R. 464:153.) The state's argument that Suarez 
"opened the door" is unpersuasive. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Suarez's rights 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause were violated. Suarez 
respectfully requests reversal of this matter. 
SUBMITTED this Lit day of AfisJjL , 1999. 
LINDA M. JONES 
VERNICE AH CHING 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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